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1 NEWCOMB’S PROBLEM 
 
Box A is transparent and contains $1,000. Box B is opaque and contains either 
a million dollars or nothing. If a demon predicts you will choose only Box B, 
then he will place the million dollars in it. If he predicts that you will choose 
both boxes, he will leave Box B empty. This demon is known to make correct 
predictions 95 percent of the time. He either places the million dollars in Box 
B or not and can no longer influence the outcome when you make your 
choice. The principle of subjective expected utility recommends taking only 
box B since there is almost certainty of winning a million dollars. However, 
the principle of dominance recommends taking both boxes since you will be 
$1,000 better off regardless of what the demon has done. (Nozick 1969) 
 
 
2  GOOFBALL CASE? 
 
David Lewis (1979) remarked that some have dismissed Newcomb’s Problem 
as a “goofball” case unworthy of serious attention. However, similarities have 
been noted with realistic problems such as common cause or ‘medical 
Newcomb’ cases and Prisoner’s Dilemma and the intellectual effort has been 
mainly devoted to reconciling the scenario of the predicting demon with 
some plausible causal structure. Nevertheless, I will suggest that these real-
life analogs have been crucially misleading by diverting attention from the 
essential function of the science-fiction. I challenge the most widely held 
assumption that Newcomb’s Problem may be given a coherent and consistent 
description and, therefore, realized in some way as a meaningful decision. 
That is, I suggest that Newcomb’s Problem is worthy of attention precisely 
because it is a “goofball” case of a certain special kind. Neglecting the character 
and implications of the Predictor’s mysterious power has led to missing its 
precise role in generating the perplexity and its recalcitrance. By analogy, 
Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise is not resolved by trying to 
reconcile the anomalous conclusion with a calculation of their relative 
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positions over time. The conclusion that Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise 
is taken as a reductio of the argument, and the intellectual task is to expose its 
fatal flaw. Newcomb’s problem has not generally been approached in an 
analogous way, since the philosophical problem has been conceived as that of 
reconciling the scenario with some plausible causal structure (Eells 1982, 
Schmidt 1998, Burgess 2004, 2012). However, I suggest that, ironically, taking 
the puzzle seriously entails embracing the paradox rather than trying to avoid 
it. Of course, embracing the paradox requires clearly articulating the 
incoherence involved. Toward this end, I will consider the shortcomings of 
several recent accounts and thereby support an alternative analysis that 
reveals the incoherence of the puzzle. I suggest an experiment in which the 
choice problem can be actually realized in a straightforward but surprising 
way that confirms the proposed analysis. 
 
The efforts to seek a causally plausible account of the Newcomb story have 
led some to conclude that the problem is under-determined or too obscure to 
permit univocal solution. Thus, McKay (2004) concludes “the right choice 
depends on extra information about the actions of the predictor not given in 
standard descriptions of the case.” Levi (1975, 1982) also blames under-
specification of the choice for the perplexity of Newcomb’s problem. Levi says 
that the conditions of choice are “too indeterminate to render a verdict 
between the two options considered” (Levi 1975, 161) and “the details given 
in standard formulations of Newcomb’s problem are too sparse to yield a 
definite solution according to Bayesian standards” (Levi 1982, 337). Levi 
concludes that, in the light of such under-specification and “obscurities” in 
the presentation of the problem, it is understandable that there should be a 
radical division of opinion on what to do and, therefore, he declines to be 
classified as either a one-boxer or a two-boxer. 
 
On the contrary, however, I will suggest that the problem is neither obscure 
nor ill-defined but rather clear, though formally paradoxical. That is, the 
circumstances of the choice are incoherent in a precisely specifiable logical 
sense. The predictor is not merely an inadequately explained fiction that 
might be reconciled with a meaningful choice given further information, as 
both McKay and Levi suggest. Rather, the notorious perplexity may be shown 
to arise from a familiar paradox. It is in this broad sense that Sorensen’s (1987) 
“instability,” Slezak’s (2005, 2006) “disguised self-reference,” Priest’s (2002) 
“rational dilemma” and Maitzen and Wilson’s (2003) “hidden regress” share a 
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“no box” view according to which the problem is ill-formed or incoherent in 
some way.1 Belatedly joining the few no-boxers, along these lines Richard 
Jeffrey (2004) renounced his earlier position that accepted Newcomb 
problems as genuine decision problems. Jeffrey suggests cryptically 
“Newcomb problems are like Escher’s famous staircase on which an 
unbroken ascent takes you back where you started” (Jeffrey 2004, 113). He 
adds that we know there can be no such things, though we see no local flaw 
in the puzzle. Jeffrey did not explain his suggestive remark further but his 
analogy is apt for a puzzle whose logical features can be precisely articulated. 
 
3   SCHMIDT: PHYSICALLY PLAUSIBLE REALIZATIONS? 
 
If Jeffrey’s analogy is apt, it suggests that a realization of Newcomb’s Problem 
will not have a plausible causal structure as commonly assumed. 
Nevertheless, J.H. Schmidt (1998) has been among those concerned to rebut 
the suggestion that Newcomb’s Problem is ‘incredible’ or cannot occur and 
seeks to “prevent this beautiful paradox from being classified as physical 
nonsense” by providing a “physically plausible way in which it can be 
realized in a classical universe” (Schmidt 1998, 68). Schmidt claims to show 
that without causal paradox the player’s choice “influences whether or not, in 
the past, the predictor put a million pounds into the second box” (1998, 67). 
Schmidt takes his physically plausible realization of Newcomb’s Problem to 
show that Newcomb’s Problem “actually involves backward causation” (1998, 
82). However, despite such strong claims, Schmidt relies on an equivocation 
on the notion of causation to establish his central claim that backward 
causation may be involved. 
 
Even charitably conceding that Schmidt’s science-fiction story of futuristic 
miniature physicists might be realizable in a way that is consistent with 
physical laws, his account delivers rather less than it appears to suggest, and 
has the distinct air of question-begging when his caveats are fully taken into 
account. In a telling qualification at the outset, Schmidt says “I will not deny 
that there are other senses of ‘causation’, according to which there is no 
backward causation in this scenario” (1998, 69). At the very least, this is an 
ironic concession since these other senses of ‘causation’ are, in fact, the 
standard physical ones and, indeed, perhaps the only ones that have 
legitimacy at all. Obliquely, Schmidt is acknowledging that his own sense of 
                                                
1 I have used “no boxer” as shorthand for someone who recognizes the problem as incoherent and, 
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causation has dubious provenance and is open to question. Despite his talk of 
philosophical problems concerning singular event causation, it is clear that 
these are irrelevant to his concerns which are misleadingly couched in the 
language of causation but are only about an agent’s subjective impressions. 
Thus, Schmidt explains: 
 
I therefore will not embark on the enterprise of constructing a general 
account of causation of my own. Instead, I will restrict myself to the 
discussion of a particular case, and argue that under the – admittedly 
rather extraordinary – circumstances described, we would have the 
intuition that we can, by an action in the present, influence an event in 
the past: i.e. that there is backward causation in that particular case. 
(Schmidt 1998, 69; original emphasis.) 
 
However, the psychological predicament of the decision maker and his 
subjective impressions concerning backward causation constitute the problem 
and not the solution to the puzzle. It becomes evident that the sense of 
backward causation that Schmidt claims is merely “whether or not there is 
considered to be backward causation “ as a “matter of personal judgement.” 
His façon de parler in talking of “anthropically oriented causal description” 
(1998, 82) and asserting “that for our ordinary human purposes, there is 
backward causation” (1998, 77) is simply a way of saying, on the contrary, 
that there only appears to be backward causation as a matter of the agent’s 
subjective impressions and avowed intuitions. Nevertheless, as we will see, 
Schmidt’s discussion is of interest through reflecting the predicament of other 
theorists who also fail to distinguish the subjective problem facing the 
decision-maker from the problem facing the theorist or philosopher. 
 
 
4   BURGESS: APPOINTMENT IN SAMARRA 
 
Like Schmidt, and for analogous reasons, Simon Burgess (2004, 2012) also 
suggests that as decision-maker you are presently in a position to influence 
the contents of the boxes. Burgess, too, supposes that the predictor may be 
imagined as “an extremely technologically advanced fellow” who also relies 
on a brainscan to make his prediction. Whereas Schmidt thinks that he can 
influence the Predictor and recommends choosing one box, Burgess thinks he 
can outsmart the Predictor and recommends two boxes.  
Page 5 
 
Burgess seeks to defend ‘causal decision theory’ over its rival ‘evidential 
decision theory,’ proposing that Newcomb’s problem must be understood as 
a ‘common cause’ problem following Eells (1982). On this basis he argues “the 
evidence unequivocally supports two-boxing as the rational option” (2004, 
261). It is important to note that Burgess does not consider the possibility that 
there might be no right choice at all in principle – the ‘no box’ alternative that 
has been independently raised by several authors for various reasons (Levi 
1975, Sorensen 1987, Slezak 1998, Priest 2002, Maitzen and Wilson 2003). 
 
We see a characteristic difficulty in Burgess’ analysis when, like causalists 
Gibbard and Harper, (1988) he is forced to count the lesser expectation of two-
boxing as what is, nonetheless, “most desirable.” Thus, Burgess says “It must 
not be imagined that the option with the conventional conditional expected 
outcome of greatest monetary value will necessarily be the most desirable and 
hence rational for the agent” (2004, 269). At the very least, it is to strain 
ordinary usage to claim that greater monetary expectation is not necessarily 
the most desirable. Of course, this strained usage is symptomatic of a deeper 
difficulty. Burgess cites Lewis’ similar response to the taunt ‘if you’re so 
smart, why ain’t ya rich?’ – namely, that riches are reserved for the irrational, 
and that the irrationality of one-boxers is richly “pre-rewarded” (Burgess 
2004, 279). Gibbard and Harper (1978) too, recommend the ‘two-box’ solution 
as rational despite being forced to admit that you will fare worse in choosing 
it. They explain: 
 
We take the moral of the paradox to be something else: If someone is 
very good at predicting behavior and rewards predicted irrationality 
richly, then irrationality will be richly rewarded. (Gibbard & Harper 
1978, 369) 
 
One is inclined to reply that, if “irrationality”, so-called, is richly and 
consistently rewarded, it must be rational to act in such ways. What principle 
of rationality would recommend a course of action for every decision in life 
even if it were known to reliably result in a worse outcome? Inevitably such 
accounts may be seen as rehearsing Nozick’s (1969) original scenario, 
repeating one position loudly and slowly to opponents. 
 
Page 6 
Burgess defends causal decision theory by assimilating Newcomb’s Problem 
to realistic ‘common cause’ problems where the recommendation of causal 
theory is acknowledged to be the rational one. But this assimilation is to stack 
the deck in favour of two-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem unless the 
differences are inessential. However, I will suggest that the differences are 
crucial and Newcomb’s problem can only be categorized as a case of common 
cause on certain untenable, question-begging assumptions. 
 
Burgess follows Eells’ (1982) analysis of the common cause structure, typified 
by the case of smoking and the cancer gene – often referred to as a ‘medical 
Newcomb’ case. It is assumed that, although there is a high statistical 
correlation between smoking and lung cancer, smoking does not actually 
cause cancer, but, rather, both are caused by a particular gene. Thus, despite 
providing unwelcome evidence that one has the cancer gene, smoking is the 
rational choice if it provides pleasure – the analog of choosing two boxes in 
Newcomb’s problem. Since backwards causation is ruled out, these choices 
cannot affect the earlier facts for which they merely provide evidence. Like 
the Calvinist who believes in a predetermined soul, you might as well sin, just 
as you might as well smoke or choose both boxes. In Eells’ terminology, the 
‘symptomatic acts’ and ‘symptomatic outcomes’ in such cases are highly 
correlated but causally independent.  
 
Burgess (2004, 283) takes Newcomb’s problem to be “a distinctive kind of 
common cause problem in that you are presently in a position to influence the 
nature of the common cause.” Burgess suggests “all you have to do to 
influence it appropriately is to make a commitment to one-boxing” – a 
strategy unavailable in the ‘medical’ cases because in those “the common 
cause is something genetic and thus effectively immutable.” 
 
We may understand Burgess’s picture from a revealing remark in which he 
supposes that we might distinguish the commitment to one-boxing from the 
actual choice itself, thereby contriving a means to avoid the predictor’s 
mysterious powers. Burgess divides the deliberation process into two stages – 
first, “the point at which the predictor gains the information used as the basis 
of his predictions” (2004, 279) by means of a brain-scan, and second, when 
Burgess alleges “the evidence unequivocally supports two-boxing as the 
rational option.” However, this attempt to split the commitment from the 
actual choice is clearly a futile attempt to outwit the Predictor in a way that is 
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ruled out by the specifications of the problem. The Predictor cannot be 
assumed to base his prediction on the wrong or irrelevant, earlier diagnostic 
brainstate – Burgess’ BATOB in Figure 1. Of course, without such a spurious 
assumption, the parallel with common cause cases cannot be maintained. The 
two-stage strategy is futile because it misconceives or reformulates the 
problem, thereby avoiding it rather than solving it. 
 
Burgess (2004, 284,5) suggests “Practically all those who fail to use the 
problem to become rich are simply ill-prepared.” However, the very idea that 
one could get rich by choosing two boxes is the clearest symptom of the flaw 
in Burgess’s account. As we have seen, even causalist advocates of two-
boxing concede that you must fare worse, while pretending that it is 
somehow rational, nonetheless. Since the statistical pattern of the Predictor’s 
success is a stipulation of the problem, there can be no question of getting rich 
by two-boxing. The suggestion that we might switch commitments in order to 
trick the predictor recalls the famous story told by W. Somerset Maugham:  A 
servant is frightened when encountering Death in the market place of 
Baghdad and, taking the master’s horse, flees to Samarra. Recounting the 
meeting to the master, Death says: “I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, 
for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra.” Despite Burgess’s 
attempted switcheroo, Newcomb’s Demon, like Death, must be assumed to 
know the truth about your final choice and not merely an irrelevant precursor 
to it. 
 
Following Eells (1982), Burgess’ picture may be represented in the schema of 
Figure 1 in which the common cause is the ‘Brainstate At the Time of the 



















The inadequacy of this schema as an analysis of Newcomb’s problem is now 
easily seen. Among the crucial differences between Newcomb’s Problem and 
common cause cases is the temporal sequence according to which the 
common cause must precede its two effects. It is only by separating some 
earlier diagnostic brainstate from the one directly responsible for (i.e., 
identical with) the actual decision that Newcomb’s problem may be 
characterised in terms of Eells’ schema for common cause problems. That is, 
Burgess assumes that the Predictor bases his action on some brainstate earlier 
than the one actually constituting the decision itself, but this opens a 
questionable gap in the causal sequence between the brainstate and the 
decision. As in the story of the precursor presentiment or ‘tickle’ (Eells 1984) 
this gap provides the room for Burgess’ two-stage strategy and supposing 
that the actual decision might somehow deviate from the one indicated by the 
brainstate being scanned, thereby evading the demon’s prediction. Clearly, 
however, this must be ruled out since, ex hypothesi, as a reliable predictor, the 
demon will anticipate such a sneaky strategy.  
 
Burgess (2012) defends his ‘two stage’ account of the decision problem, but 
his account misses the force of criticisms along the lines just noted. Burgess 
has taken the brain scan story too literally and, thereby, introduces new, 
extraneous assumptions which significantly alter the problem. The brain scan 
story has been an inessential dramatization and embellishment of the 
Demon’s method of prediction but it cannot be used in Burgess’ manner to 
introduce irrelevant features of the scenario. In his original article introducing 
the problem, Nozick (1969) made no mention of brain scans but only “One 
might tell a science-fiction story about a being from another planet, with an 
advanced technology and science” (1969, 114). He adds “One might tell a 
longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being’s 
prediction about your choice in the situation … will be correct” (1969, 114). 
That is, the story of the brain scan is a purely illustrative heuristic device to 
dramatize the Predictor’s abilities. His method of predicting choices is not 
specified and is not an essential part of the Problem or relevant to the source 
of its special puzzlement. Since the prediction is inescapable as a stipulation 
of the problem, Burgess has simply changed the story and thereby made his 
solution irrelevant. Burgess cannot give his analysis without the special 
features of the brain scan and its timing. However, the only essential, non-
negotiable feature of the problem is the near-infallibility of the predictions. 
Therefore, Burgess’ two-stage account, it can in principle have no bearing on 
Page 9 
the problem as he insists. In particular, the time of the brain scan BATOB 
cannot be separated from the decision and actual action since it is this 
inescapable prediction that justifies Jeffrey’s (1983) characterization of the 
problem as “a secular, sci-fi successor to the problems of predestination.” 
Nozick says only “The being gathers his data on the basis of which he makes 
his prediction” (1969, 132). Thus, we might change the illustrative 
embellishment to imagine that the Predictor uses a high-tech crystal ball to 
foretell future states of the physical world and, therefore, does not rely on any 
monitoring of the subject’s brain at all. The problem is unchanged, but 
Burgess cannot run his version of the story.  
 
Although futile, Burgess’ ruse captures something of the inescapable paradox 
of trying to avoid one’s self – to flee one’s fate. As we will see, the assumption 
of the demon introduces an additional step in what is, in fact, the anticipation 
of one’s own decision. We will see that, if not through backward causation, 
the ‘state of nature’ is, nonetheless, not independent of my choice. Thus, it 
may be acknowledged that a prior brainstate could be a highly reliable, even 




5   NOT TAKING SCIENCE FICTION SERIOUSLY 
 
In view of such efforts in the same vein, Eells’ (1982) original assimilation of 
Newcomb’s Problem to common cause cases is instructive. Significantly, Eells 
notes, “At first sight, it seems that there may be important differences 
between the decision situations of Newcomb’s paradox and those of other, 
less fantastic, Newcomb situations” but he concludes “I do not think that 
these are really important differences” (1982, 210). We may examine Eells’ 
revealing grounds for this assimilation. He writes: 
 
It seems that if the agent is rationally to have enormous confidence in 
the accuracy of the predictor ... then the agent must believe that there is a 
causal explanation for his success, though he may not know what that 
explanation is, and neither may the predictor. Indeed, it seems 
presupposed by much of our inductive reasoning that a high statistical 




Up to this point, Eells presents the predicament facing the agent in making 
sense of the decision problem according to the canons of inductive, causal 
reasoning. However, it is significant and typical that Eells slips from the 
perspective of the agent to the perspective of the philosopher or theorist in the 
immediately following remarks. He continues: 
 
The only kind of causal explanation of the predictor’s success that I can 
think of that is consistent with the set-up of Newcomb’s paradox is one 
that invokes a common cause ... Indeed, ... that is the only possibility, 
since the predictions do not cause the acts and the acts do not cause the 
predictions. ... Also, it seems that on any plausible account of any kind of 
successful prediction, the causal structure must be of this form. (Eells 
1982, 210-11; emphasis added after first.) 
 
Now Eells offers the common cause analysis as the only possibility he can 
think of as plausible according to the usual standards of scientific reasoning, 
thereby conflating the agent’s perspective with that of the theorist seeking to 
explain the source of the apparent conflict among decision principles. This 
surreptitious collapse of the two perspectives has the effect of imposing 
irrelevant constraints on the theorist who need not, after all, be bound by 
those of the science-fiction story. Above all, there can be no requirement that 
an analysis must conform with what is a plausible causal structure such as 
Eells’ illustration of weather prediction. The science-fictional nature of the 
problem frees us, indeed precludes us, from wondering how such a predictor 
could possibly accomplish his success. Furthermore, it is clear that imposing 
such requirements of plausibility on our account of the predicting demon 
must be entirely gratuitous. Eells continues: 
 
 A successful predictor must have – consciously or unconsciously – a 
method, in the sense that the predictions are based on observations, 
conscious or unconscious. And if we look far enough back in the causal 
chain culminating in the relevant observations, we must be able to find 
factors that are causally relevant to the event predicted. It is easy to see 
that this is the causal structure involved in weather prediction, for 
example. (210-11; latter two emphases added.) 
 
While Eells is surely correct in his remark that, on any plausible account, the 
structure must be of the form of common causes, the point is precisely that 
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we, as theorists, are not required to seek a plausible account in this sense for a 
fantastic fictional concoction. The effort to do so has not merely involved 
inventions that go beyond the story’s specifications, but has also, 
consequently, diverted attention from the source of the puzzlement generated 
by the science-fiction.  
 
It is important to notice that Eells’ concern with finding a ‘causal structure’ 
has been a consistent leitmotif in subsequent discussions. For example, 
Schmidt’s “empathic” focus on the subjective intuitions of the decision-maker 
is not merely an error, but a seductive conflation of agent and theorist. Qua 
decision-maker constrained by the stipulations of the story, we inevitably 
seek to impose some plausible causal structure onto the subjectively puzzling 
situation we are confronted with, but qua theorist we obviously need not be 
confined in the same way. Similarly, McKay (2004, 188) writes “The right way 
to approach the Newcomb problem is to attempt to work out the underlying 
causal structure, just as the causalists prescribe.” Evidently McKay, too, seeks 
to makes sense of Newcomb’s problem along the line of the foregoing 
remarks by Eells, but my suggestion is that this has been a crucial mis-step. 
 
Eells’ final analogy with our reasoning in weather prediction is telling, since it 
indicates the effort to make the puzzle comprehensible in keeping with his 
view that there are no “really important differences” between Newcomb’s 
problem and less fantastic situations. Significantly, Eells says that the 
common cause structure is the only kind of causal explanation of the 
predictor’s success that he can think of. However, the question that remains 
unasked is why we should seek a plausible explanation at all in this way, 
rather than assume that the problem may be inherently incapable of being 
reconciled with any causal structure.  
 
Similarly revealing in this regard is Burgess’ suggestion that we consider the 
problem on the basis “that you are the subject of predictions” (2004, 262) – an 
invitation to consider the philosophical problem from the point of view of the 
deciding agent. For Burgess, this stance is adopted “simply for ease of 
exposition,” but resort to the first person is not merely an innocent expository 
device. Notoriously, intractable puzzles arise when deliberations attempt to 
accommodate prior determination or fore-knowledge of the choice itself 
(Popper 1950).2 As we will see, the significance of first-person reflection on 
                                                
2 Burgess (2012) dismisses my reference to Popper but he evidently fails to recognize the direct 
relevance of the logical, explanatory incoherence to which Popper is drawing attention. 
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one’s own decisions has been discussed (Levi 1997, Schick 1979, Rabinowicz 
2002), though its specific implications for Newcomb’s problem appear not to 
have been fully recognized. 
 
Thus, McKay (2004) suggests that the reliability of the “shadowy predictor” is 
so extraordinary, even though backwards causation is impossible, “it 
undermines your belief that your choice can have no causal influence on the 
action of the predictor” and even “challenges the conviction that the action of 
the predictor is genuinely in the past” (2004, 188). McKay says that faced with 
the predictor’s reliability, “it is not impossible that you would come to believe 
that there is some cleverly arranged cheating going on” (2004, 188). Indeed, if 
it were not fiction but a real case, we would be desperate to find some 
plausible basis for the phenomenon. McKay, like Eells, does not take the 
science-fiction seriously because she insists on reconciling it with science-fact. 
To be sure, taking Jeffrey’s (2004) suggestive metaphor, if we encountered 
what appeared to be an Escher staircase in real life, we would be anxious to 
resolve the anomaly in a way that is consistent with geometry and physics, as 
Richard Gregory (1981) has actually demonstrated with an apparent real-life 
Penrose triangle. However, finding a respectable scientific analysis of 
Newcomb’s Problem is surely not required for the solution of a science-fiction 
puzzle.  
 
By seeking implicit causal structure in the problem, Eells. McKay and most 
other philosophers have failed to accept the inherently occult nature of the 
correlation between our choice and the predictor’s actions. In particular, we 
are not at liberty to retell the story in a way that eliminates the puzzle arising 
from the predictor’s mysterious ability, as many accounts do, for example, by 
gratuitous appeal to unspecified additional information. The demon’s ability 
and the peculiar link between one’s choice and the previously determined 
contents of the opaque box is the central, defining feature of Newcomb’s 
problem. It is this mysterious link that prompted Jeffrey’s (1983) original 
characterization of the problem as “a secular, sci-fi successor to the problems 
of predestination.” The science-fictional nature of the problem frees us, 
indeed precludes us, from wondering, as both Eells and McKay do, how such a 
predictor could possibly accomplish his success. That is, solving Newcomb’s 
problem may be achieved not only by showing how it may be reconciled with 
some plausible causal structure, but also by revealing exactly why it can’t and, 
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thereby, the inherent source of its paradox. Thus, McKay’s (2004) insistence 
on the relevance of a causal connection is to miss the characteristic point of 
the puzzle. However, if we are not misled by analogous problems that are 
realizable, we may accept the inexplicable, occult correlation between our 
choice and the predictor’s earlier action, and thereby focus on the logical 
structure of the puzzle, rather than its supposed causal structure.  
 
This approach having nothing to do with rationality or decision theory, meets 
the important desideratum of revealing the source of the problem’s peculiar 
obduracy. The present analysis is along the lines of Priest’s (2002) account of 
‘rational dilemmas’ for which “rationality gives no guidance on the matter” 
(2002, 15). When we see the specific mechanism giving rise to the impossible 
choice, we dissolve the pseudo-problem it presents. 
 
6  HIDDEN REGRESS: DEMON’S AND LIARS 
 
In particular, Newcomb’s problem may be understood as a game against 
one’s self in which one’s choice is based on deliberations that attempt to 
incorporate the outcome of this very choice (Slezak 2006). Newcomb’s demon 
is simply a device for externalizing and reflecting one’s own decisions. This 
hidden circularity facing the decision-maker arises because, as we 
contemplate our best move, we consider the demon’s decision, which is 
actually based on this very choice we are trying to make. As we deliberate, we 
are, in effect, representing the demon’s deliberations as incorporating our 
own. The very hypothesis of such a demon requires conceiving that he is 
representing our current representations. We see the vicious circularity, the 
self-reference implicit in Newcomb’s problem that is hidden by the usual 
formulations. You are, in effect, attempting to predict your own choice. 
 
In Figure 2 we can see a portrayal of the manner in which the puzzle arises – 
namely, through the effort to represent the demon’s reasoning, which in turn 
represents our own. Of course, the depiction of the demon on the left is that of 
a fiction, but the right hand picture captures our reasoning and the source of 
the puzzle in attempting to internally represent the hypothesized demon on 
the left. Of course, the puzzle arises in this way only for the decision-making 
agent or subject faced with the choice which is not necessarily the situation of 


























The foregoing analyses suggest that the puzzle has important affinities with 
notorious self-referential paradoxes such as the Liar. However, contrary to 
Maitzen and Wilson (2002, 155), Newcomb’s puzzle does not arise by analogy 
with an infinitely long, infinitely complex proposition that is 
incomprehensible. They claim that the analogy with the Liar consists in the 
fact that “Every constituent of the sentence is comprehensible, but, arguably, 
the sentence itself is not” (2002, 155). On the contrary, however, the problem 
of the Liar arises precisely because the sentence is perfectly meaningful and 
appears to be both true and false. The paradox with its contradictory truth 
values would not arise if the Liar sentence were meaningless. Maitzen and 
Wilson miss the way in which the Liar paradox does indeed illuminate 
Newcomb’s problem as we see when the analogy is properly understood. 
 
Thus, the agent’s deliberations and predicament may be represented 
alternatively with the relevant propositions as follows, where we see a 
familiar schema and paradox arising from self-reference: 
 
(1) The demon predicts whatever I choose. 
 





Both Boxes One Box 





Both Boxes One Box 
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(3) I choose the opposite of whatever I choose.  
 
The decision problem involves self-reference in a way that is reminiscent of 
familiar paradoxes in other domains. These features of the problem may be 
seen in a formulation by Skyrms (1982) that eliminates the complexities of the 
conflict between expected utility and dominance principles. As before, 
however, the choice that secures the reward depends on the prediction of a 
‘mean demon.’ Given a choice between two boxes, if the mean demon expects 
you to choose box X, he will put the money in box Y and vice-versa. You 
should choose the opposite of whatever the mean demon thinks you will 
choose. If the mean demon is reliable, this means that you should choose the 
opposite of whatever you would choose! The best choice is whatever you 
decide not to do.  
 
Your vacillation between choices is precisely parallel with the familiar 
alternation of truth values in the Liar paradox where the sentence is 
successively both true and false, each one leading directly or indirectly to its 
opposite. Thus, the familiar Liar sentence may be given as:  
 
(p) It is not the case that (p) 
 
More generally, the problem arising from self-reference is a version of the 
‘paradoxes of grounding’ (Herzberger 1970). Thus, contradiction can arise not 
only from a sentence that asserts its own falsehood, but indirectly as in the 
following pair of sentences: 
 
(q) Sentence (r) is true. 
 
(r) Sentence (q) is false. 
 
Neither of these sentences is meaningless or paradoxical, but together they 
generate a contradiction – the ‘deferred’ Liar. Newcomb’s Problem has the 
structure of such indirect or deferred paradox in which the contradiction is 
mediated by intervening steps. The predicting demon acts as an intermediary 
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serving to externalise what is, in fact, a loop in one’s attempt to second-guess 
one’s self.3 
 
7  EXPERIMENTALLY REALIZING  THE PREDICTOR 
 
The foregoing analysis of an incoherent decision problem may be readily 
confirmed in an empirically realizable arrangement that precisely simulates 
the choice situation of the agent in Newcomb’s Problem. The subjective  
predicament of confronting the predictive powers of Newcomb’s demon may 
be easily simulated without resorting to the fanciful accounts we have seen.  
 
We noted earlier that Schmidt’s “strange but possible story” may be 
questioned regarding its realizability. His tiny sub-particle, super-predicting 
“dwarf” creatures whose scientific knowledge is millennia ahead of our own 
are surely questionable on the grounds of plausibility. However, the essential 
features of Schmidt’s (1998) story, like that of Burgess, involving a brain-scan 
can be re-cast in a form that is readily realized in practice and tested in an 
actual experimental set-up with available techniques employing well-known 
facts of neuroscience. 
 
An experiment permits confirming the foregoing suggestions about the 
structure of the problem. W. Grey Walter misled surgical patients into 
thinking that their voluntary action of pressing a button caused an effect such 
as advancing the carousel of a slide projector. In fact, the button was not 
connected to the slide projector at all and the slides were advanced directly by 
amplified signals from implanted cortical electrodes. Dennett (1991, 167) 
explains that the patients were startled by the effect because “it seemed to 
them as if the slide projector was anticipating their decisions.” Clearly, the 
same arrangement could provide a startling impression that one’s choice of 
boxes is being predicted in Newcomb’s Problem. Instead of advancing a slide 
carousel, a computer could simply register whether a million dollars is placed 
in the opaque box or not. There can be little doubt about the subjective effect 
of such an arrangement. While unremarkable in itself, such an experiment 
suggests the source of Newcomb’s paradox and elusiveness. 
 
However, essentially the same experiment may be performed without such 
intrusive surgical procedures. Libet’s (1985) work on the subjective delay of 
                                                
3 See also Sorensen, (1986). 
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consciousness of intention and the so-called “readiness potential” or 
“preparatory response” provides a means for a laboratory simulation of 
Newcomb’s Problem. We may obtain precise, reliable predictions of a 
subject’s actions from the prior state of their brain in a way that does not 
depend on any utopian neuroscience. EEG recordings from scalp electrodes 
show that the instant of a subject’s conscious decisions are between 350 and 
400 milliseconds later than the onset of cerebral electrical activity that is the 
substrate of the voluntary action. These “readiness potentials” show that 
voluntary actions are preceded by unconscious neural activity and, as 
Dennett (1991, 163) puts it, “your consciousness lags behind the brain 
processes that actually control your body.” These data are not particularly 
surprising despite the seeming paradox for our naïve notions of free-will. 
However, my concern here is with the opportunity these phenomena provide 
for generating a laboratory experiment in which a subject is confronted with a 
precise and revealing simulation of Newcomb’s Problem. It is a trivial matter 
to connect the scalp electrodes to a computer screen in such a way that 
detection of the readiness potential for a choice would cause a million pounds 
or nothing to be placed in the second opaque box – before the subject 
consciously “makes the decision.” Since this would happen in the 
milliseconds prior to the subject’s conscious decision, it would amount to a 
prediction by the computer of the subject’s choice. It is clear that this 
experimental arrangement is a precise parallel to Schmidt’s elaborate fiction 
about sub-microscopic dwarfs with a futuristic physics or any standard 
account of Newcomb’s Predictor. Just like Schmidt’s creatures or Burgess’ 
brain-scan and other such suppositions, the electrodes rely on neurological 
activity to predict the subject’s decision, and the money is either placed in the 
opaque box or not according to the usual rule. 
 
8  CHEATING THE SUBJECT & ELIMINATING THE DEMON 
 
Finally, although realizable in practice, the technical difficulties of exploiting 
the readiness potential may be circumvented altogether without altering the 
logic of the scenario. The point may be more conveniently and more 
convincingly demonstrated by a modification of the experiment that 
dispenses with the foregoing methods altogether while preserving the 
essential features of the brain-scan and the decision problem. This time, the 
computer simulation of the boxes and their contents may be arranged so that 
a touch-screen or push-button registers the subject’s choice. However, an 
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illusion of predicting the choice may be created by having the ‘demon’ place 
the money in the opaque box (or not) at the instant after the subject indicates 
his choice, but before the contents of the box are revealed to him. In other 
words, the subject’s actual choice is used to give the appearance of having been 
predicted. Although cheating in an obvious sense, the subjective impression 
on the chooser (Schmidt’s central concern, as we saw) would be identical with 
the case of genuine prediction by means of a brain scan. It should be clear that 
there is no essential difference from Newcomb’s original problem, but in this 
case its logical structure and incoherence is now completely transparent: 
Although he does not know it, the subject is plainly making a futile attempt to 
incorporate the outcome of his own current decision into the very 
deliberations about it, unwittingly violating the precept of Schick and Levi. 
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